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Decisions vary. They may vary in both content and complexity. People also vary. An
important way that people vary is how much they think. Some prior research investi-
gating thinking and decision making largely conflicts with most traditional decision
theories. For example, if considering an array of products to choose from, thinking
more about the alternative's attributes should lead to a better decision. However,
some research indicates that thinking more may also lead to focusing on irrelevant
aspects of the decision and a less optimal outcome. We propose that this conflict in
the literature exists because of a failure to consider the interaction between the indi-
vidual and the decision task. To test this, we used separate methodologies that
enhance or attenuate a person's thinking. In Study 1, we selected people who were
especially high or low in need for cognition and had them complete a robust
decision-making inventory, which included both complex and simple tasks. In Study
2, we manipulated participant's level of glucose, which acts as the brain's fuel to
enhance or attenuate thinking ability. Both studies provide insight for understanding
our central tenant that more thought leads to better decisions in complex tasks but
does not influence simple decisions. These findings show how the individual's think-
ing can interact with the constructive elements of the task to shape decision choice.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Every decision-making event can be thought of as consisting of two
players: the person and the task. Undoubtedly, all people vary
(e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), and, importantly, we vary in how
much we think about decisions, sometimes thinking more, sometimes
less (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). The other player in the decision event is
the decision task per se. In as much as people vary, it too is certain to
vary on key factors such as complexity (e.g., Lewin, 1936). Some deci-
sions are easy, containing elements that can be solved with little
effort; others are complex and require a thoughtful analysis
(e.g., Payne, 1976). In the current investigation, we examine both
players (the person and the decision task) and explore how they inter-
act within a decision-making event to shape our decision choice. We
tested how thinking relates to decision making for both simple and
complex decisions. To carry out this examination, we used an individ-
ual difference methodology to measure motivation to think and a cog-
nitive resource technique to manipulate ability to think.
In this paper, prior to describing our empirical studies and their
results, we present an extensive literature review leading to develop-
ment of the hypotheses for the present studies. This includes a review
of the role of thoughtfulness on decision making, which presents
mixed results; a review of the role of individual differences in decision
making; development of hypotheses concerning the joint effects of
person characteristics and task characteristics, particularly
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distinguishing between simple and complex decision-making tasks as
operationalized in the separate components of decision-making com-
petence; and a review of research with the variables used in the pre-
sent research—need for cognition (NFC) and glucose level. We test
whether more thinking, via glucose enrichment or higher NFC, will
lead to better decision making in tasks that are sufficiently complex to
incur a thoughtfulness advantage. As we discuss in more detail later,
enhanced thinking should only produce a decision-making advantage
when the decision task contains enough elements amenable to
thoughtful manipulation (i.e., the decision is sufficiently complex).
1.1 | Thinking and decisions
There exists a rich tradition in the literature that suggests that more
thoughtfulness will lead to better decision making (e.g., Edwards,
1954; Kunda, 1990; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Miller & Fagley, 1991;
Pachella, 1974; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992). Payne, Bettman,
and Johnson (1988) suggest that people rely on a type of effort-
accuracy trade-off, meaning they can use heuristics to guide their
decisions or they may be more thoughtful and overcome heuristics
for better decision making. Similarly, Kunda (1990) suggests that moti-
vation leads to more willingness to apply cognitive skills that lead to
better reasoning and decision making.
Kahneman (2011; see also Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Fred-
erick, 2002) has adopted a System 1 and 2 approach (see Stanovich &
West, 2000) that purports most decisions are made by virtue of Sys-
tem 1, which operates automatically with little effortful thought.
However, if people are sufficiently motivated and able to process
using the more effortful System 2, then alternatives are thoughtfully
contrasted, weighed in a deliberative fashion, and more optimal deci-
sions should be reached. Reyna and Brainerd (1995, 2011) present an
alternative to psychophysical models and provide evidence that think-
ing operates in parallel with two kinds of mental representations of
information: precise verbatim representations and multiple gist repre-
sentations. Gist representations capture the meaningful essence of
information and are normally relied on preferentially, even when ver-
batim information is physically present and remembered. In this view,
which contrasts with System 1 versus System 2 approaches,
monitoring/inhibition is distinct from gist-based thought and from
verbatim-based analysis. Research has shown that specific decision
biases that have been attributed to mental shortcuts (one definition of
heuristics) are instead gist based. Nevertheless, individuals who think
more are apt to inhibit those biases when inconsistencies in their deci-
sions are salient (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Reyna & Brainerd,
2008). Altogether, prior theoretical research in decision making coa-
lesces around the assumption that more thinking will lead to better
decision making. One focus of this prior research is the concept of
decision-making competence and how it relates to cognitive ability.
One of the most widely used measures of decision-making com-
petence is the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC). In their
initial analysis of the A-DMC subsections, Bruine de Bruin, Parker,
and Fischhoff (2007) find that the applying decision rules (ADR) was
the subsection most highly correlated with the two measures of cog-
nitive ability: the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices and the
Nelson–Denny Reading Comprehension subtest, which are measures
of fluid and crystalized intelligence, respectively. Later findings also
provide support that ADR is particularly complex, showing that ADR
is involved with more cognitive aspects of decision making (Bruine de
Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012), especially those most associated
with fluid intelligence and numeracy (Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruin de
Bruine, 2010). As evidence of the complex nature of the ADR subset,
research has also shown that it likely involves executive function com-
ponents that are different from the other A-DMC subsets (Del
Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012). For example, Del Missier
et al. (2010) provide evidence that ADR involves the inhibition func-
tion in executive processing, a process that involves active suppres-
sion of alternative responses and attentiveness to the goals of a
decision while inhibiting items that might interfere. We describe the
full A-DMC in more detail later in the paper, and we illustrate the key
role played by the ADR component.
Complexity in the ADR arises from the application of decision
rules that vary, and this ability to correctly apply decision rules is a
crucial factor when decisions involve multiattribute choices
(e.g., Payne & Bettman, 2004). Research suggests that the processing
of competing response alternatives involves interference that must be
inhibited (Reyna, 2004). For example, in the ADR, choices involve
picking an option that obeys the stipulated decision rule (e.g., highest
on product reliability and nothing else) and inhibiting choices of the
best option that follows some other rule. More generally, this process
involves attention to goals (rule application) while inhibiting irrelevant
information, commonly referred to as the inhibition function (Del Mis-
sier et al., 2010). Some of the decision rules involve mathematic com-
putations and comparisons among alternatives while maintaining the
value of alternatives and updating their relative standing. Other deci-
sion rules involve comparisons among first level attribute options, and
if no clear advantage can be found, comparisons among second level
attribute options must follow. For example, if someone is looking to
purchase a house, multiple criteria are likely important. Probably, one
key attribute is price; lesser attributes might be style and age. If the
first level attribute of price is common among several houses, then
comparison of the second level attribute of style should follow and
potentially continue to the next attribute if all styles are similar. A
common factor among the decision rules is that, because of their
underlying complexity, greater thinking should give the person an
advantage for a more optimal decision choice.
However, not all research has supported the contention that
more thinking leads to better decisions. For example, in a series of
studies by Wilson and Schooler (1991; see also Schooler, Ohlsson, &
Brooks, 1993), the researchers did not test specific theoretical predic-
tions; rather, they examined whether depth of thinking about alterna-
tives will improve or degrade decision performance. For example, in
one study, Wilson and Schooler provided participants with several
items (e.g., brands of strawberry jam) from which they were to choose.
Participants in the motivated thought condition were asked to analyze
and think about their preference and be prepared for an evaluation of
their decision, whereas participants in the control condition were told
nothing. Expert ratings were obtained beforehand and used to com-
pare with participants' responses to rate the quality of decision mak-
ing. Wilson and Schooler speculated that decision makers who think
more also consider the alternatives in more depth. However, thinking
more can focus attention on irrelevant aspects of the stimuli that are
later used when making one's choice. Consequently, more thoughtful
decision makers can make worse decisions when they think more
about alternatives that have irrelevant characteristics. Although the
experiments in this study were ad hoc, the overall findings challenged
the belief that more thought always leads to better decision making.
In a subsequent study, Wilson et al. (1993) had participants
choose between posters that they were allowed to keep. In the exper-
imental condition, they were asked to provide rationales for their
choice that focused participants' decisions on product attributes and
changed their choices relative to a control group who simply chose
their favorite poster. Interestingly, participants who reasoned about
the product's attributes also had more regret over their decision
3 weeks later, suggesting that an initial “thoughtless” decision might
have better long-term appeal. Related research testing fuzzy-trace
theory (FTT) has shown evidence that decision making and cognitive
resources are independent (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). As we discuss
later in the article, decision making is often gist based, which requires
very little cognitive resources. This finding stands in contrast to many
dual-process theories that rely on working memory as an integral part
of the system involved in decisions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
In a related piece, Pelham and Neter (1995) also investigated the
effects of thinking on decisions while including the additional element
of task complexity. In several studies, they manipulated motivated
thinking by telling participants the task was important (e.g., correlated
with intelligence) or not (e.g., assesses intuition and judgment). Task
complexity (Studies 1 and 2) was manipulated by varying heuristic and
biases problems such as The hospital problem from Tversky and Kah-
neman (1981), wherein people are shown not to consider sample size
when considering probabilities, even when it is clearly stated in this
case as a comparison between a large hospital with 45 babies and a
small one with 15. Participants' decision ability was assessed by their
choice of the numerically superior alternative. Their findings showed
that in the more thought/high motivation condition, participants made
more optimal decisions on less complex tasks but performance
decreased on more complex decision tasks. Pelham and Neter inter-
pret their findings by suggesting that the motivation manipulation
they used in their study depleted participants' cognitive resources,
which led to less optimal decision making on the more complex tasks.
As Pelham and Neter state, “when people's cognitive resources are
heavily taxed, their attempts to make especially accurate judgments
may backfire” (p. 590). Though speculative, this raises the possibility
that a lack of ability to use cognitive resources may have contributed
to the decreased performance in the complex task.
Similar results have been found when cognitive ability was com-
promised through sleep restriction. For example, performance accu-
racy was attenuated for more complex Bayesian tasks when
participants were in a state of sleep restriction rather than being well
rested (Dickinson & McElroy, 2019), and similar decision detriments
during sleep restriction and circadian mismatch were found for com-
plex decisions involving updating and attentional processes
(McElroy & Dickinson, 2019). Sleep preferentially promotes memory
for gist over verbatim detail and, under certain circumstances, can
promote gist-based false memories over veridical ones (Ellenbogen,
Hu, Payne, Titone, & Walker, 2007; Payne et al., 2009). Whereas
memories are less accurate (from a verbatim perspective) after sleep,
gist memories may, in the end, be more useful because they capture
essential information.
Finally, in addition to the studies we have discussed, an ad hoc
summary by Ariely and Norton (2011) points out several ways in
which more thinking can harm decision making. Ariely and Norton
suggest that considering too many attributes of the alternatives can
lead to overweighting of unimportant attributes. Another is that think-
ing can lead to bias toward alternatives that are justifiable or easy to
explain to others. Lastly, thinking too much can lead people to con-
sider too many options and simply become “overwhelmed” with the
sheer number of options and fail to make a good decision, if they
make one at all. This type of overthinking of decision situations nor-
mally leads to suboptimal decision choices. Despite the evidence for
the role of depth of thinking on decision quality, there has been lim-
ited research on individual differences that drive these effects.
1.2 | Individual differences in thinking and
decisions
There was a commonly held assumption in decision-making research
that “people are people” and human variability is not considered an
aspect of the decision-making process. In his hallmark piece, Edwards
(1954) notes that when decision researchers of the time applied their
theories, it was assumed that the decision maker is completely
informed, sensitive to infinitesimally small changes in a target's value,
and perfectly “rational.” Although Edwards' work helped create a gen-
eral model of a decision maker, it did not specify how varying human
attributes may be accounted for in the decision-making process. As
Bruine de Bruin, Del Missier, and Levin (2012) note in their discussion
of the field, not enough has been done to address the topic of individ-
ual difference in decision making. For example, the dominant theory in
decision research, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), is a
psychophysical model designed to account for group effects. Individ-
ual differences were not emphasized as a part of this theory, but they
were recognized as potential contributors (e.g., on p. 280, differences
in the values of the theory's parameters). Thus, different individuals
may have different psychophysical functions. Although this acknowl-
edgment was a part of their theory, it was never strongly emphasized,
and predictions for how individual differences would influence or
interact with theoretical assumptions were never fully developed.
Investigating how factors that vary within the individual are asso-
ciated with decision making informs us about the normative nature of
decision making and is crucial for understanding how people think
about the decision (e.g., Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019; Levin, 1999;
Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). For example, individual limitations in
cognitive ability are a likely suspect for much of the variability found
within decision tasks (Stanovich & West, 2000). Differences in cogni-
tive ability are also certain to play a role in decisions (e.g., Cokely &
Kelley, 2009; McElroy & Dickinson, 2010), though that varies with the
type of decision task (Stanovich & West, 2008). More recently, one
individual difference variable that has shown promise for shedding
light on the decision process is numeracy, or the understanding and
ability to work with numbers (Peters et al., 2006).
Research has shown that highly numerate individuals possess
more optimal decision-making skills in a variety of analytically based
decision-making situations (e.g., Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo,
2011; Peters & Levin, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). Stanovich and
West (2008) have also shown that cognitive ability appears not to be
associated with decision-making ability on some classic heuristic and
biases tasks including base-rate neglect, framing effects, conjunction
effect, outcome bias, “less is more” effects, sunk-cost effect, anchoring
effects, omission bias, reference-dependent preferences—willingness
to accept/willingness to pay, the certainty effect, and myside bias.
However, Stanovich and West (2008) found that people with
higher cognitive ability displayed better performance on some types
of judgment and decision-making tasks, such as probability learning,
that are arguably more complex. In a similar line of reasoning but with
different results, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007); Bruine de Bruin, Parker,
and Fischhoff (2012) also looked at the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and performance on decision tasks that were less complex.
Their results did show a positive relationship between fluid cognitive
ability and decision performance. One difference separating these sets
of studies is that Stanovich et al. drew from a traditional college popu-
lation that should be less diverse in cognitive ability whereas Bruine
de Bruin et al. (2007, 2012) relied on a community-based sample that
was balanced with socioeconomic status, a population that should
have been more “cognitively diverse.”
Eberhardt, Bruine de Bruin, and Strough (2017) examined two
types of individual difference variables: the cognitively oriented
numeracy and experience-based knowledge as well as the non-
cognitive characteristics of emotions and motivation. They examined
how these individual difference variables relate to age and financial
decision making. For the cognitively oriented variables, their findings
showed that numeracy was related to better performance on credit
card repayment whereas experience-based knowledge was relevant
to better performance on resistance to sunk costs and money man-
agement. Together, both numeracy and experience-based knowledge
were associated with higher performance on a decision outcome
inventory that focused on financials. In terms of the noncognitive vari-
ables, higher levels of motivation were marginally associated with bet-
ter performance on resistance to sunk costs whereas less negative
emotions about financial decisions were marginally associated with
better performance on an outcome measure of financial decisions.
One common individual difference characteristic is how people's
decisions are influenced by lifespan changes in cognitive development
(e.g., Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000; Gozdas, Holland, & Altaye,
2019). For example, adolescence is often characterized by increased
risk taking, but research shows that this may be due to differences in
adolescent mental representations of the potentially risky options
(Reyna, Wilhelms, McCormick, & Weldon, 2015). Relative to younger
adults, older adults may be more prone to emotional changes that
then affect their decision making (Bruine de Bruin, 2017; Eberhardt
et al., 2017), and experience can lead to a better intuitive gist of risky
situations and allow avoidance of risky, and potentially harmful,
behavior (Reyna & Reyna & Farley, 2006). For example, they report
less negative and more positive emotions after losses (Bruine de Bruin,
van Putten, van Emden, & Strough, 2018; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson,
2015), appear to make more suboptimal choices in financial risk taking,
and are less likely to choose a maximizing decision strategy (Bruine de
Bruin, Parker, & Strough, 2016; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015).
1.3 | Motivation for the current study
Although these individual differences most certainly play a role in
decision making, they also share similarities in that they rely on ability
differences. We believe this to be an equally important part of the
decision. One logical assumption that can be drawn from research on
ability differences is that complexity of the decision task matters. To
clarify, another way of looking at these findings is that the decision
tasks may be more complex for some individuals than for others. A
central tenet in this paper is that a greater understanding of the
decision-making process can be found when considering the interac-
tion between aspects of the decision maker, such as motivation and
ability to think, and the constructive elements of the decision task,
whether it is simple or complex. In the next section, we discuss NFC,
an individual difference variable that measures differences in thinking
propensity and is a factor singled out for the present Study 1.
1.4 | Association between NFC and decision
making
NFC is defined as a tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cogni-
tive endeavors (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Differences in NFC arise
from intrinsic motivation and remain relatively stable across a person's
lifetime. For example, individuals high in NFC appear to perform bet-
ter on memory tasks (Boehm, 1994; Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983)
and are generally more positive toward cognitively difficult tasks
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Low NFC individuals have
been shown to rely more on peripheral information when forming atti-
tudes and evaluating situations (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and are
more prone to using contextual cues (Cacioppo et al., 1996). All told,
NFC is an index of an individual's preferred level of thinking that is
intertwined with decision-making quality (e.g., Bruine de Bruin,
McNair, Taylor, Summers, & Strough, 2015). Next, we sift through the
tide of NFC research and focus on studies that highlight how NFC is
associated with decision making.
Several studies have hinted at how NFC may be associated with
decision making. For example, high NFC individuals spend more effort
searching for information in a decision task (Verplanken, Hazenberg, &
Palenéwen, 1992) and exert more effort overall when making deci-
sions (Verplanken, 1993). In one study looking at decision processes,
Levin, Huneke, and Jasper (2000) measured the association of NFC
with a multiple-option environment. Participants were faced with the
task of narrowing their options (via including or excluding them) and
then made a choice from among the available options. They found
that high NFC participants narrowed their choices more than did low
and they acquired twice as many pieces of information in the inclusion
condition but not in the exclusion condition.
Research focusing on susceptibility to biases has also found NFC
differences. For example, D'Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer (1992) pres-
ented participants with a traditional attitudinal measure in which they
were told that another student was forced to write a speech about a
particular topic. They found that only participants low in NFC demon-
strated what is commonly referred to as the correspondence bias.
That is, they made dispositional inferences about the student based
on the speech they were forced to give. Further, Ahlering and Parker
(1989) found that low NFC subjects were more likely to display a pri-
macy effect. And Peer and Gamliel (2012) found that high NFC indi-
viduals were more likely to correctly calculate the normative response
for estimating traveling speed whereas low NFC participants relied
more on a percentage heuristic, calculating time savings by relying on
a proportional increase from previous speed to faster speed.
1.4.1 | Framing effects
The decision-making area that has received the greatest attention
from NFC researchers looks at how the problem's presentation or
“frame” is associated with decision choice. Framing can be broadly
conceived, but a classification system developed by Levin, Schneider,
and Gaeth (1998) organizes framing into three types: risky choice,
attribute, and goal framing. In one of the earliest examples, Smith and
Levin (1996) measured whether NFC was associated with two types
of decision tasks. In Study 1, they used a slightly modified version of
Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) “ticket problem.” They found that
participants low in NFC were strongly affected by the problem's pre-
sentation (losing a ticket vs. losing an equivalent amount of money a
priori) whereas high NFC participants showed little to no effect,
suggesting that effortful thinking plays an important role in mental
accounting, in this case recognizing the equivalence of the same out-
come expressed in different terms. In their second study, Smith and
Levin explored whether NFC was associated with decision responses
to a human life problem (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982) by
presenting either a “mortality” or “survival” frame. Again, they found
framing effects for low NFC participants but little to none for high
NFC participants.
A number of later studies also provide some support for NFC dif-
ferences in framing. Zhang and Buda (1999) tested whether NFC was
associated with an advertising message in the form of an attribute
framing task and found that low NFC participants exhibited stronger
framing effects. Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, and France (2000) tested
mental accounting rules using a type of goal framing task involving
furniture prices and found that only low NFC participants demon-
strated framing effects but the findings seemed to be limited to the
gains situations. In another goal framing study, Steward, Schneider,
Pizarro, and Salovey (2003) presented participants with a smoking-
cessation message and showed that low NFC individuals also
responded more strongly to the message frame. Simon, Fagley, and
Halleran (2004) found somewhat similar effects for a risky choice task
when they focused on NFC as a moderating variable. However, they
found that NFC was only associated with strength of framing when
combined with either high math ability or a manipulation designed to
induce depth of processing.
Another side to this research story suggests that a person's level
of NFC is not associated with the likelihood of framing effects. In a
paper that singled out NFC to directly test these competing notions,
LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) included a larger sample of participants
across multiple studies including seven different framing tasks.
Embedded within this design were both risky choice and attribute
framing tasks. They tested depth of thinking by having some partici-
pants provide justification for their decisions, NFC served as their
measure of individual differences in thinking.1 The findings across
both studies failed to support the hypothesis that greater thinking
(higher NFC) leads to attenuation of framing effects.
More support for the LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) finding that NFC
level is not associated with framing effects can be found in an in-
depth analysis by Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, and Lauriola (2002). In this
investigation, they sought to determine the effectiveness of a within-
versus between-subjects design for examining framing tasks as well as
the viability of the three framing types. Within their design, they also
incorporated a number of individual difference variables—among them
was NFC. Their findings showed that NFC had no significant interac-
tions with any of the variables in this study, including the different
types of framing.2 This study, along with others, shows mixed results
for the question of whether NFC is associated with framing effects.
We explore this issue further in the current Study 1.
A final study that we review specifically addresses the question
of whether thinking more will help optimize or hinder performance on
complex decision tasks. In this study, Unnikrishnan Nair and
Ramnarayan (2000) measured participants' NFC levels and provided
them with a computer-simulated 2.5-hr task that included a series of
complex problems revolving around a multifaceted management task
involving time and calculable product outcomes. Better decision mak-
ing was defined as successful performance on several different out-
come measures. The findings from this study showed that high NFC
individuals were better at solving complex decision tasks across the
variety of outcome measures. Further, the findings revealed that high
NFC individuals reported that the task was easier, dealt with more
1In Study 1, LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) report an NFC range in their sample from −57 to +71
(M = 25.1, SD = 20.8) and Mdn = 27. In Study 2, they report a range of −68 to +69 (M = 19.1,
SD = 22.3) and Mdn = 20. It is also important to note that in this study they also obtained a
median split to define high and low NFC.
2As with other studies we have reviewed, it should be pointed out that the range of possible
NFC scores was limited due to the sample size (N = 102) and the use of college students as
the sample population.
decision-related information, as measured by total units of informa-
tion collected for the task, and considered more aspects of the
alternatives.
Throughout these studies, an important aspect of their design is
what constitutes better or maximizing performance. Determining opti-
mal performance is a function of the nature of the task, and in many
laboratory tasks, better performance is noted by processing more
details. It is important to note that laboratory experiments may not be
consistent with real-world situations, especially when processing
amounts of information determines decision performance. For exam-
ple, research on FTT suggests that people who process a greater
quantity of trivial details will perform “better” if the laboratory task or
performance measure gives credit for processing arbitrary trivial
details, as psychological and neuroscientific studies sometimes do
(e.g., see Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Although verbatim processing is
often considered advanced in laboratory research, gist processing has
been associated with advanced cognition and better decision making
in real life—as FTT predicts (Reyna & Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna
et al., 2011). One factor that influences real-world decision making is
the decision maker's current satiation level, which plays a profound
role in the ability to think, operationalized in our Study 2 as blood glu-
cose level.
1.5 | Glucose and the ability to think
The human brain is small when compared with overall body mass, rep-
resenting only about 2% of the total weight of an adult human, yet it
utilizes 20–30% of the body's total energy needs (Benton, 1990). Glu-
cose fuels this massive energy consumption almost exclusively, mak-
ing it a key variable for autonomic and executive brain functions.
Glucose, simply put, is sugar present in the bloodstream. The level
of blood glucose varies considerably because the brain is surprisingly
poor at storing it for extended periods and it requires a continuous
supply (Benton, 1990; Gonder-Frederick et al., 1987). Following the
consumption of food or drink containing sugar, blood glucose levels
normally rise sharply after about 12–15 min and return to baseline
over the course of about 2 hr. If a shortage of glucose occurs, then
the brain cannot function optimally, and a variety of cognitive func-
tions will likely be affected.
As evidence of this, glucose demand and usage appear to parallel
cognitive thought. This relationship is highlighted in a study by
Donohoe and Benton (1999) wherein the researchers used positron
emission tomography scans to observe participants who first con-
sumed a glucose or placebo drink. After consuming the drink, partici-
pants performed a cognitively demanding task, or they sat in a control
room. The positron emission tomography scans revealed that partici-
pants performing the cognitively demanding task had significantly
lower glucose levels, indicating a greater usage of blood glucose dur-
ing the task.
Researchers have also looked at how glucose levels influence a
variety of tasks that draw upon more specific cognitive processes. For
example, when glucose-deprived participants are given a glucose
enriching substance, research has shown performance improvements
in facial recognition tasks (Metzger, 2000), verbal working memory
(Messier, Pierre, Desrochers, & Gravel, 1998; Sunram-Lea, Foster,
Durlach, & Perez, 2001; Sünram-Lea, Foster, Durlach, & Perez, 2002),
and spatial abilities (Sunram-Lea et al., 2001). In a similar manner, glu-
cose deprivation has been shown to inhibit performance in several
complex tasks such as mental calculation (Schächinger, Cox, Linder,
Brody, & Keller, 2003) and the Stroop task (Benton, Owens, & Parker,
1994). Another way of observing the impact that glucose may have
on cognition is through dietary intake. Specifically, there is a large
body of research that suggests that eating a nutrient sufficient break-
fast can increase subsequent cognitive performance (Hoyland, Dye, &
Lawton, 2009; Pollitt & Mathews, 1998).
Although there is good evidence that cognition depends upon
glucose, there is also evidence that the magnitude of glucose's influ-
ence may vary with the complexity of the task. For example, in a study
by Kennedy and Scholey (2000), the researchers tested glucose
effects on tasks varying in complexity including a more complex Serial
7 task that requires a person to count backwards from 100 by 7 s, a
moderately complex task of Word Retrieval that involves naming
words that start with a specific letter, and a less complex Serial 3 task
that involves counting down from 100 by 3 s. Their overall findings
showed that glucose improved performance but only on the most
complex task. Perhaps the best evidence that cognitively complex
tasks are more heavily dependent upon glucose can be found in a
study by Scholey, Harper, and Kennedy (2001). In this study, Scholey
et al. (2001) included a balanced design, controlling for domain (word
tasks) and cognitive demand while manipulating glucose deprivation
and measuring blood glucose levels. Their findings again showed that
glucose improved performance on the more cognitively demanding
task but not on the simple task. Altogether, these studies provide
compelling evidence that complex tasks are more dependent upon
and affected by glucose level.
1.6 | Glucose effects on decision making
In this section, we focus on research that has examined more closely
how glucose affects decision making. By and large, there seems to be
a discrepancy across studies, with some findings showing predictable
effects of glucose on decision choice but others showing no effects at
all. This discrepancy is illustrated in a recent meta-analysis by Orquin
and Kurzban (2016) wherein categorical distinctions among the differ-
ent types of decision tasks show that glucose effects are not consis-
tent across task domains. Another important finding in their meta-
analysis is that some situational variables, most notably with food as
the reward medium, will have profound effects on the influence of
glucose in decision making. Specifically, Orquin and Kurzban find that
“The analysis revealed a significant positive effect of blood glucose
levels on decisions style meaning that low blood glucose increases the
tendency to make intuitive rather than deliberate decisions on tasks
that are not food related” (p. 558). For the purposes of our experi-
ment, we used the A-DMC, a decision inventory, which contains tasks
that are amenable to more intuitive or deliberative processing effects.
And importantly, our study involved class credit, not food, as the
incentive.
In one study, McMahon and Scheel (2010) focused on decisions
involving probability learning. They found that when transitioning
from the more simple maximization strategy to the more thoughtful
rule-based probability matching task, participants in the glucose-
deprived condition engaged in more simple maximization strategies.
Participants in the glucose-enriched condition were also more likely to
follow a rule-based probability approach. This “reversal finding” fits
well with predictions of FTT (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). Specifi-
cally, as highlighted in FTT, simple gist-based intuition (rather than
verbatim analysis) is the more advanced mode of operation for adults.
In the instance of McMahon and Scheel, the simpler strategy of opti-
mization, which should rely on gist extraction and comparison, is actu-
ally superior. The more complicated probability matching strategy
should require verbatim processing while yielding a lower payoff. Fur-
ther research is needed to explore the mechanisms behind this effect.
For example, it is unclear whether participants might experience a lack
of motivation because of past conditioning with high glucose levels
(i.e., feeling full from food consumption) while also having the brain
glucose enriched or whether it may involve less working memory
capacity (Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008).
This finding suggests that a lack of glucose leads to reliance
on decision strategies that are less effortful. Related work by Dick-
inson, McElroy, and Stroh (2014) is consistent with this viewpoint.
In their study, glucose enrichment increased response times, and
these longer response times improved accuracy on more difficult
Bayesian choice tasks, which suggests glucose promoted more
effortful decision strategies necessary for success in more difficult
choice environments.
Masicampo and Baumeister (2008) used a different type of
decision task to test glucose effects on decision making. In this
study, they used an attraction task wherein participants first evalu-
ate two options based on different attributes. A third “decoy”
option, which is inferior on all attributes, acts to lead decision
makers toward whichever alternative is more similar to the decoy.
Prior research shows that reliance on the decoy option reflects
more heuristic, less effortful decision making (Simonson, 1989).
Masicampo and Baumeister report that glucose-deficient partici-
pants were more likely to make less optimal choices by relying on
the decoy, which again suggests more heuristic, less effortful deci-
sion strategies for glucose-deficient individuals.
In another investigation, Wang and Dvorak (2010) looked at how
glucose influences future discounting, a phenomenon wherein future
rewards are seen as less valuable than immediate rewards. Their find-
ings showed that glucose-deprived participants were more likely to
engage in future discounting whereas enriched participants were bet-
ter able to regulate the value of expected future rewards versus
immediate payoffs in a decision. Later research has also supported
this finding by showing that glucose consumption reduces delay dis-
counting and makes future options more attractive (Wang & Huangfu,
2017).
Together, these studies suggest that glucose deprivation is
associated with less thoughtful decision making and more reliance
on simple decision strategies whereas glucose enrichment leads to
more deliberative, thoughtful decisions. However, it is unclear
whether glucose improves decision making across all types of deci-
sions or whether it primarily enhances decision tasks that are more
complex as some research has suggested (e.g., Scholey et al.,
2001).
1.7 | Predictions
Based upon the body of literature, we believe that more thinking, as
revealed by glucose or NFC, should lead to better decision making but
decision improvement will depend upon the complexity of the decision
task. That is, for greater thinking to have an advantage, the normative
reasoning task must contain enough elements amenable to thoughtful
manipulation, so that more thinking can produce an advantage. In
other words, the task must be sufficiently complex (e.g., difficult but
solvable math) so that more thinking will give the decision maker an
advantage.3
1.8 | Identification of simple and complex tasks
In our study, we chose to use the A-DMC, a decision inventory that
contains several subsections specific to different types of decision
making. As we describe later, most of the subsections contain decision
tasks that are relatively simple in nature, such as a confidence esti-
mate of a true/false response or estimating the percentage of people
who would support a socially unacceptable behavior. However, as we
have previously discussed, the A-DMC contains the more complex
subsection of ADR.
Based upon our analysis of the available research, we formu-
lated the following hypotheses regarding how thinking will be asso-
ciated with decision-making outcomes for complex and simple
decisions:
Hypothesis 1. When normative reasoning decision tasks are complex,
such as those found in ADR, we predict that more optimal
decisions will be observed when the decision maker is more
thoughtful such as when they are high in NFC or are glucose
enriched.
Hypothesis 2. For normative reasoning decision tasks that are sim-
pler, such as those found in the other subsections of the A-
DMC, we predict that more thinking, such as being high in
NFC or glucose enriched, will not affect performance on these
decision tasks.
3In the current analysis, we differentiate between more thinking, in terms of level of
thoughtfulness as opposed to insightful thinking as discussed in FTT (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd,
2011).
2 | STUDY 1
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants and design
A total of 1,292 participants took part in the initial online NFC screen-
ing, and a total of 30 high and 30 low NFC participants took part in
the final decision-making phase. The conditions were roughly equal in
terms of gender with 20 females in the high NFC condition and 25 in
the low condition; gender was not a factor in the analysis of this study.
All participants were undergraduate students. The experiment utilized
the subject variable of NFC (high or low), and the dependent variables
were the participants' overall and subsection scores on the A-DMC.
2.1.2 | Materials
Need for cognition
NFC is one of the most widely investigated individual difference traits
and reflects a tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive
endeavors (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). In order to assess participants'
level of NFC, we used the NFC scale developed by Cacioppo, Petty,
and Kao (1984). The measure contains 18 items (e.g., “I only think as
hard as I have to”); participants are asked to indicate how much they
agree or disagree on a 9-point scale ranging from very strong disagree-
ment (−4) to very strong agreement (+4). Total scores on this scale can
range from −72 to 72.
The A-DMC
We wanted to include a measure of decision making that would allow
for a thorough assessment of different decision tasks while also all-
owing us to test our specific hypotheses involving simple and complex
tasks. Because of this, we chose the A-DMC inventory (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007).
The A-DMC inventory (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) consists of
134 individual items. The inventory contains six subsections that mea-
sure resistance to framing, recognizing social norms, under/-
overconfidence, ADR, consistency in risk perception, and resistance
to sunk costs. The combined measure is designed to assess compe-
tency in decision making. The decision-making ability measured by
the A-DMC should be considered a trait that varies with respect to
the individual (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). All seven components as
well as the combined score have demonstrated good validity by their
significant associations with measures of cognitive ability and
decision-making styles (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). In support of its
predictive validity, research has shown that individuals who score
higher on the A-DMC report having experienced fewer negative deci-
sion outcomes in their lives and they also tend to have higher educa-
tion levels (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
Resistance to framing. Resistance to framing reflects the extent to
which variations in how the problem is presented or framed
influence decision choice. Because framing effects represent a form
of decision bias, resistance to these effects has been taken as a
positive indicator of decision competency. Resistance to framing is
composed of two different types of framing tasks: risky choice and
attribute. These two types of framing are measured by seven prob-
lems each, with each problem being presented in both positive and
negative frames. Importantly, each type of framing is manipulated
within-subjects. Both the positive and negative versions of the task
are spaced well apart, appearing after a number of intervening
tasks, so as to minimize the chance that participants simply
remember and repeat an earlier response when they receive the
second version of the same problem. Thus, this sub-
section represents a balance between risky choice and attribute
framing. In the risky choice problems, participants are presented
with a situation (e.g., the outbreak of a disease) followed by both
a sure option and a risky option of equal expected value. The
options are framed either positively (people saved) or negatively
(people die). In the attribute framing problems, participants are
presented with normatively equivalent events (e.g., buying ground
beef) wherein the key attribute is described in either positive (80%
lean) or negative (20% fat) terms. A 6-point scale was used for rat-
ing both types of framing tasks; this allows for assessment of even
weak preferences toward an alternative (Levin et al., 2002). Later,
we describe how we separate the attribute and risky choice mea-
sures to present a resistance score for the respective types of
framing.
Recognizing social norms. Recognizing social norms is a measure of an
individual's ability to assess social appropriateness of certain social
norms and their propensity to engage in these peer-related social
interactions. In this task, participants are presented with 16 different
negative behaviors (e.g., Do you think it is sometimes OK to steal
under certain circumstances?). They are asked to initially rate the
acceptability of the bad behavior, and later, they are asked to estimate
the percentage of people who would support this negative behavior.
Performance is measured by the strength of the relationship between
acceptability of the behavior and estimated percentage of peer
endorsements of the interactions. It should be pointed out that this
subsection is different from other decision subsections in the sense
that it measures social knowledge and adherence to a normative stan-
dard rather than a particular bias. Further, “morality” is not measured
in a right or wrong sense; the scale reflects social knowledge of appro-
priate behavior and the individuals' self-reported likelihood of
engagement.
Under/overconfidence. Under/overconfidence is a measure of how well
calibrated individuals are at assessing the correctness, or accuracy, of
their responses. In this section, participants are first presented with
34 statements (e.g., Amman is the capital of Jordan.) and asked to
indicate whether they believe these statements to be true or false.
Next, participants are asked to rate on a 50% to 100% scale how con-
fident they are in their true or false assessment. For example, after
answering true or false to the statement “alcohol causes dehydration,”
participants then rate their confidence in that answer. Performance is
assessed by calculating the absolute difference between mean confi-
dence and percentage correct.
Applying decision rules. The decision rules task was adapted from an
earlier version of the A-DMC (originally called the DMC). In the cur-
rent A-DMC, the decision rules task is purposely constructed to be a
more complex decision task relative to the other subsections. This
subsection involves having individuals use different decision rules to
indicate which of five DVD players they would purchase in a hypo-
thetical situation. Participants are first provided with a hypothetical
persons' decision rule (e.g., Brian selects the DVD player with the
highest number of ratings greater than “Medium.”) and then asked to
make a choice among five DVD players. Aspects of the DVD players
such as sound quality and brand reliability vary on a 5-point scale. To
obtain a “correct” response score, the participant must apply the cor-
rect decision rule and choose the alternative that optimizes the hypo-
thetical person's goal. The decision rules used in this task are derived
from research by Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) and include
elimination by aspects, satisficing, lexicographic, and equal weights.
Furthermore, the task contains an interference aspect, in that respon-
dents are required to use the stipulated rule while suppressing other
options, including the decision alternative that might initially appeal to
them the most. This complex and taxing mental comparison, along
with the mathematical calculations involved in these decision prob-
lems, highlights the complex nature of this subsection.
Consistency in risk perception. Consistency in risk perception reflects a
person's consistency across risk judgments and is a measure of a par-
ticipant's ability to follow probability rules. Participants are asked to
rate the likelihood of a given event happening to them (e.g., “what is
the probability that you will have a cavity filled during the next year?”).
The probability rating ranges from 0% to 100%, and the probability of
each event is assessed for the “next year” and “the next 5 years” in
separate parts of the survey. The frame pair is scored as correct if the
probability for the event happening the next year is less than or equal
to it happening in the next 5 years. Within each time frame, three item
pairs are presented as nested subset and superset events. In order to
be accurate, the probability of a subset event cannot exceed a super-
set event (see FTT's class-inclusion account of gist and verbatim rep-
resentations; for a theoretical account, see Reyna, 2004; Reyna &
Brainerd, 2008). Additionally, within each time frame, two comple-
mentary events are presented, as such their combined probability
must total 100% to be scored as correct.
Resistance to sunk costs. Sunk cost is a measure of participants' ability
to avoid the entrapment of prior investments in a particular target
item. In this task, participants are presented with 10 scenarios. In one
example, “You are buying a $200 gold ring on layaway for someone
special, you have a $100 deposit on the ring,” but a monetarily better
“new” option is discovered (e.g., same ring can be purchased for
$90 at another store). However, you will lose your original deposit if
you purchase the ring for $90. Participants are asked to rate on a
6-point scale whether they would stick with the less viable option that
they had invested in or switch to the new, monetarily advantageous
alternative. The scale ranges from 1 (most likely to choose) staying with
the chosen option (e.g., continue paying at the old store [the sunk-
cost option]) to 6 (most likely to choose; buy from the new store [nor-
matively correct option]) where higher scores are indicative of greater
resistance to sunk cost.
2.1.3 | Procedure
When we designed Study 1, we were mindful of the nature of our
study, in particular with respect to two primary factors. First, NFC is
not well distributed in the college population, with a negative skew
favoring more high NFC participants (e.g., LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003).
Second, pretesting showed that participants needed an approximate
time window of 45 min to complete the A-DMC. With these factors
in mind, we balanced our desire to capture the integrity of the NFC
variable while being mindful of the practicality of using the thorough
but somewhat lengthy A-DMC measure. Based upon these consider-
ations, we decided not to use a simple median split for our study;
rather, we chose to increase the power of the investigative variable
and utilize a more laborious procedure so that we could include the
very low NFC participants who would not otherwise be captured in
the skewed distribution of a college sample. The trade-off of this
design is that much of the variance in the middle scoring individuals is
not captured but, given the skewed nature of the NFC variable in our
population and the length of time to complete the study, we decided
it was a necessary sacrifice.
The initial screening for NFC was conducted through an online
survey using Sona software. During this first screening, participants
were informed about the nature of the study, including potential par-
ticipation in a follow-up session. Participants were then asked to com-
plete the NFC scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984). After completion, they
were awarded credit, and this concluded the initial screening stage.
Because our investigation relied on contrasting those who were espe-
cially low to those especially high in NFC, we used our first semester
sampling of 535 participants (Mdn = 16, M = 15.97) to establish
criteria for categorizing high and low NFC throughout the study
recruitment phase. To establish categories, we used the upper and
lower 10% quantiles of this first semester distribution, which yielded
a categorization of ≥42 as high NFC and ≤−11 as low NFC. These
criteria also served as the recruitment rubric for the remaining three
semesters.
The NFC scores in the total screening sample of 1,292 partici-
pants ranged from −52 to 70 with a mean score of 14.7 and median
of 16. Standardized recruitment emails were sent out each semester
inviting participants to take part in the decision-making study. Over
the course of four semesters, a total of 253 eligible participants were
invited to take part in the decision-making phase of the study. For
those who responded, an experimenter attempted to schedule a time
for the follow-up lab meeting. As is common in this type of selection
process, a number of qualified participants had already obtained their
needed credit or had scheduling conflicts with available lab times. The
high NFC participants who took part in the decision-making phase
had scores ranging from 42 to 62, and low NFC participants had
scores ranging from −11 to −39 (see Figure A1).
Selected participants who agreed to take part in the follow-up
session were first provided with informed consent and were then
instructed to begin the A-DMC. The task was presented via paper and
pencil. Any remaining instructions were consistent with the validated
version of the task, and compensation was not dependent upon per-
formance (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). The entire task lasted approxi-
mately 45 min; participants were instructed to wait quietly until
everyone had completed the task. Participants were then debriefed
about the study, provided with an opportunity to ask questions, and
thanked for their participation. All participants were awarded credit to
be applied toward their class experiential learning requirement.
2.2 | Results
After completion of the study, the data were organized, and each
subsection was combined into a unified measure as outlined in the A-
DMC (see also Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). To investigate our hypothe-
ses, we then performed separate analyses on each of the subsections,
the overall A-DMC score, and a division of the framing tasks. The cat-
egorization of NFC (high or low) served as the subject variable for all
analyses. Because the A-DMC is standardized so that higher scores
are indicative of better decision making, we were able to hypothesize
that the enhanced thought of high NFC participants should lead to
higher scores on complex decisions tasks, and little or no difference
from those scoring low on simpler tasks. To test this, we performed
separate one-tailed t tests on participants' choices in each of the A-
DMC subsections as well as the overall decision score. Means and
standard deviations for each subgroup and overall scores are pres-
ented in Table 1 as well as the results of the respective analyses.
In the first analysis, we compared the overall A-DMC composite
score for the two groups. As can be seen in Table 1, this analysis was
not significant. Next, we examined the resistance to framing subsec-
tion. An important aspect of this subsection is that it contains a pur-
poseful balance between attribute and risky choice framing tasks.
Because evidence strongly suggests that these tasks are fundamen-
tally dissimilar (Levin et al., 1998; Levin et al., 2002) and more recent
evidence shows a clear distinction in underlying processes (Levin
et al., 2015; Levin, McElroy, Gaeth, Hedgcock, & Denburg, 2014), we
analyzed the risky choice and attribute framing tasks separately. To
do so, we created an average of the seven positively valenced tasks
and a separate average of the seven negatively valenced tasks for
both types of framing. We then obtained a difference score by sub-
tracting the negative framing average from the positive for both attri-
bute and risky choice (see Table 1 for means). The difference scores
of the valence averages for each of the respective framing typologies
served as separate indexes for our analysis. This analysis revealed no
significant differences for NFC thinking style for either type of fram-
ing (see Table 1).
Next, we examined the complex decision rules, which allowed us
to test Hypothesis 1. The results of this analysis are also presented in
Table 1. In this subsection, we predicted that those high in NFC would
make better decisions. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found
highly significant differences between high and low NFC thinkers. As
can be seen in Table 1, the pattern of results in the ADR subsection is
in the predicted direction for complex decisions, providing evidence
that high NFC individuals perform better on complex tasks but not
simple ones. Thus, complex decisions but not simple decisions display
a pattern consistent with much of the theoretical work in decision
making and supports our Hypothesis 1 prediction.
TABLE 1 Means and SDs of nonstandardized A-DMC scores for need for cognition and analysis of A-DMC component scores and composite
score, one-tailed t test for need for cognition levels
A-DMC score
Need for cognition
t (60) p d
Higha Lowa
M SD M SD
A-DMC composite 1.27 0.12 1.26 0.11 −0.47 .32 0.09
Recognizing social norms 0.51 0.21 0.44 0.18 −1.2 .117 0.36
Under/overconfidence 0.88 0.06 0.89 0.14 1.68 .95 0.09
Applying decision rules 0.79 0.16 0.67 0.16 −2.9 .003 0.75
Consistency in risk perception 0.64 0.11 0.62 0.12 −0.79 .22 0.17
Resistance to sunk costs 4.10 0.12 3.97 0.60 −0.83 .21 0.30
Attribute framing resistance 0.11 0.59 0.14 0.52 0.22 .59 0.05
Risky choice resistance −0.42 0.51 −0.46 0.6 0.69 .75 0.07
Note. The A-DMC composite is calculated by averaging nonstandardized component scores. The subsections containing a negative t value were not
statistically significant in the opposite direction for either the one-tailed or two-tailed test. Mean values for attribute and risky choice framing resistance
were obtained by using a difference score of the average of the seven positive frames from the average of the seven negative frames.
Abbreviation: A-DMC, Adult Decision-Making Competence.
an = 30.
In the final analysis, we tested the subsections that contain nor-
mative reasoning decision tasks that are simpler than the complex
decision rules subsection and are aligned with Hypothesis 2 predic-
tions. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1. Across
all of the subsections containing simple decision tasks (recognizing
social norms, under/overconfidence, consistency in risk perception,
and resistance to sunk costs), the analyses revealed that NFC level
had no effect on decision-making performance in these subsections.
The finding that effortful thought does not improve performance on
simple decision tasks supports the Hypothesis 2 prediction.
3 | STUDY 2
3.1 | Method
In Study 2, we examined the part of our hypothesis that focuses on
the ability of the decision maker. We adopted a standardized method
using a sugar drink to increase blood glucose levels that should
enhance a decision maker's ability to think as well as a placebo non-
sugar drink for comparison. Consistent with Study 1, we used a com-
puterized version of the A-DMC scale (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) to
measure ability effects on simple and complex decision tasks.
3.1.1 | Participants and design
One hundred and thirty-eight glucose-deprived participants (fasting
for >3 hr before breakfast; 98 females) took part in the study. Partici-
pants were all undergraduates and were recruited using the Sona soft-
ware system. Participants received credits toward fulfilling a
requirement for an undergraduate psychology course. The design of
the study included the independent variable of glucose level (enriched
or deprived), which was manipulated via random assignment of either
regular (sugar sweetened) lemonade (40-g sugar) or sugar-free lemon-
ade (placebo, 0-g sugar). The dependent variables were aggregate
scores on the A-DMC.
3.1.2 | Procedure
When participants initially signed up for the study, they were pro-
vided with basic information including the need to fast for at least
3 hr before the study began. Participants who had glucose sensitivity
were asked not to sign up for the study. The minimum amount of time
allowed between study sign-up and the study start time was 24 hr so
that participants could prepare for fasting. The evening before the
study was to take place, participants were emailed and reminded
again not to eat or drink anything for at least 3 hr before their study
session was set to begin. To help participants comply with the fasting
requirement, experimental sessions took place during the morning
hours. Upon arrival, participants were presented with informed con-
sent and again reminded of the fasting aspect of the study, and they
confirmed that they had complied. Thus, all participants should have
arrived in a glucose-deprived state.
Each study session included one to three participants. Partici-
pants were seated at an individual study carrel that contained a stan-
dard computer setup with monitor and keyboard. Upon arrival,
participants were first provided with informed consent.4 After con-
sent was obtained, participants were instructed to drink the lemonade
that had been placed on the study carrel in front of them. After com-
pleting consumption of the lemonade drink, participants were pres-
ented with several unrelated filler tasks that had been devised to take
approximately 15 min. The purpose of these filler tasks was to provide
enough time for the glucose to be absorbed into the bloodstream
(e.g., Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). After completing the filler
tasks, participants were given instructions to begin the computerized
A-DMC task that was presented using a standard Optiplex computer
and 20-in. monitor. Remaining A-DMC instructions were provided
within the computerized version of the task. After completing the A-
DMC, participants were instructed to wait quietly until everyone had
finished the task. Participants were then debriefed about the study,




To test the effects of glucose level, we relied on a procedure utilized
in prior research to experimentally manipulate blood glucose levels
(e.g., Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008; McMahon & Scheel, 2010). In
this procedure, a sugar drink or placebo is consumed, and a postco-
nsumption distractor task takes place for 10–15 min.5 This distraction
period gives the sugar sufficient time to be absorbed into the blood-
stream. Research has shown a sustained increase in participants'
blood glucose for at least 45 min postdistraction period (Kennedy &
Scholey, 2000).
Well in advance of our study, a research assistant who did not act
as experimenter prepared the drink manipulation. This preparation
consisted of covering the drink can with a gray foam cover and black
electrical tape so that no part of the can's label could be seen by par-
ticipants. The drink was then coded with a subject number. The condi-
tion (glucose or placebo) was recorded separately and stored in a
password-protected spreadsheet not accessible to the experimenter.
This double-blind procedure allowed us to be confident that neither
the participant nor the experimenter was aware of any individual par-
ticipant's assigned condition.
To manipulate glucose, we used a Minute Maid® Lemonade
drink that can be purchased at most grocery stores. We chose to
use this standard drink because it is something that participants
would commonly experience, and pretesting indicated that the
4Because of the double-blind procedure, one participant was granted credit and dismissed
from the study due to concerns about the contents of the drink.
5Wang and Dvorak (2010) show that a 10-min wait period is sufficient to significantly
increase blood glucose levels after sugared soft drink consumption.
sugar-free lemonade drink tasted very similar to the regular lemon-
ade. Both drinks were in 12-oz cans. The regular Lemonade con-
tained 40 g of sugar, and the Light Minute Maid Lemonade
contained 0 g of sugar. To maintain consistency in time of con-
sumption, participants were instructed to drink the lemonade as
quickly as possible.
3.2 | Results
We hypothesized that glucose enrichment would not improve perfor-
mance in simple decision tasks, but it should lead to more optimal
decision making in complex tasks. To test this, we again performed
separate analyses on the overall decision score, each of the A-DMC
subsections as well as separate analyses for attribute and risky choice
framing resistance. The means and standard deviations for each sub-
section, subdivided framing subsection, and overall scores are pres-
ented in Table 2. The results of the analysis for each section and
overall score are also presented in Table 2.
In our analysis of the findings, we first tested whether partici-
pants in the glucose-enriched condition made normatively better
choices as reflected in the overall A-DMC composite score. As can be
seen in Table 2, there was no significant difference in this composite
score. Glucose enrichment did not improve decision making in the
simpler normative reasoning decision tasks of recognizing social
norms, under/overconfidence, consistency in risk perception, sunk
costs, and the risky choice resistance subsection. The attribute fram-
ing subsection was significant. More importantly, more thinking, as
operationalized through glucose enrichment, did improve decision
making in the section of ADR, the subsection that contains more com-
plex decision tasks.
4 | DISCUSSION
Knowing whether more thought will lead to better decision making is
important, foremost because it represents what most people believe
and also because it lies at the heart of most decision-making theories.
Yet this assumption has been shadowed by research showing that
depth of thinking has no effect on decision making (e.g., LeBoeuf &
Shafir, 2003) or may even make it worse (e.g., Wilson & Schooler,
1991). In the current investigation, we explored this fundamental
question while considering both the individual's propensity and ability
to think and the complexity of the decision task. First, we show that,
as most theoretical models in decision making suggest, more thinking
does lead to better decision making but this effect is limited to tasks
that are sufficiently complex. In other words, the decision task must
contain constructive elements through which more thoughtful analy-
sis can lead to a more optimal decision choice. For simpler decision
tasks, it appears that enhanced thinking has less influence on decision
making. Overall, this investigation provides a way to organize empiri-
cal findings and formulate a coherent message about how thinking
relates to decision making.
The findings we have discussed likely play out in numerous every-
day decisions, and, while most of the time their consequences are
benign, sometimes their consequences may be of great importance. A
lingering question is whether more thinking will be beneficial or even
advantageous in life. For example, consider the simple choice of decid-
ing between two types of toothpaste. A thoughtful individual may not
make a better choice when faced with the common front-label infor-
mation of “90% of dentists recommend this brand over the leading
brand” versus “180 out of 200 dentists surveyed recommend this
brand over the leading brand.” If enhanced thought is focused on the
more complex details of the ingredients and health information on the




t (138) p d
Glucosea Placeboa
M SD M SD
A-DMC composite 1.22 0.13 1.24 0.12 −0.99 .16 0.011
Recognizing social norms 0.48 0.17 0.44 0.20 1.12 .13 0.018
Under/overconfidence 0.76 0.09 0.78 0.09 −1.26 .11 0.01
Applying decision rules 0.76 0.13 0.54 0.24 −1.70 .05 0.04
Consistency in risk perception 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.09 −0.19 .43 0.002
Resistance to sunk costs 3.93 0.65 4.00 0.49 −0.62 .27 0.03
Attribute framing resistanceb −0.10 0.45 0.12 0.51 −2.6 .006 0.46
Risky choice resistance −0.48 0.61 −0.58 0.80 0.9 .80 0.14
Note. A-DMC total is the average of the nonstandardized component scores. The subsections containing a negative t value were not statistically significant
in the opposite direction for either the one-tailed or two-tailed test. Mean values for attribute and risky choice framing resistance were obtained by using a
difference score of the average of the seven positive frames from the average of the seven negative frames.
Abbreviation: A-DMC, Adult Decision-Making Competence.
an = 69.
bA separate set of analyses revealed that positive attribute framing was rated as less positive in the glucose-enriched condition (M = 3.61) than the placebo
(M = 3.83), t = −2.71, p < .004, d = 0.45, but there was no significant difference in the negative frame condition, t = −0.07, p < .47, d = 0.02.
back labels, then will the individual make a healthier choice? Alterna-
tively, imagine the more serious scenario of someone considering an
elective surgery. If the only information available to the person is the
surgery success rate of 85%, then more effortful thought may not help
with better decision making, whereas if more decision information
such as probabilities based upon disease progression, patient specifics,
and other outcome-relevant information were included, effortful
thought should produce an advantage. It is also important to consider
whether more detailed analytic thinking is even desirable in some real-
world decisions. For example, according to FTT, humans developmen-
tally change and come to rely more on meaningful gist than verbatim
analysis. Further, gist reliance increases alongside enhanced knowl-
edge and experience within a domain, which acts to further improve
the “goodness” of the gist and should lead to more biases but also bet-
ter real-world decisions (Blalock & Reyna, 2016; Reyna, 2018).
These findings also hold insight for theoretical questions as well.
For example, Levin et al. (2014, 2015) suggest that attribute framing
may involve decision processing that is more emotionally driven
whereas risky choice framing may involve a more cognitive type anal-
ysis because it requires the integration of probability and outcome
magnitude. The findings from the current set of studies show that, at
least in terms of Study 2, attribute and risky choice framing were dif-
ferentially affected by our manipulation and this may reflect underly-
ing processing differences. This finding also seems to suggest that the
ability (glucose levels) to overcome or inhibit the more emotional attri-
bute frame response may be more impactful than the motivation to
do so, as defined by NFC. We found no differences in the strength of
risky choice framing for either of our thinking manipulations.
According to FTT (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991, 1995), verbatim informa-
tion quickly fades in memory, and decisions are usually based on gist
representations. In this case, leveling more thought toward the gist
representation of “mostly good” or “a little bad” should not change
the outcome of the person's choice. However, there is research show-
ing that when information is presented per attribute (Abadie,
Waroquier, & Terrier, 2017) or when gist memory is better organized
via relevant decision information (Abadie, Waroquier, & Terrier,
2013), decision making may improve.
There is also the question of whether a person is “bound” by
usage of a particular heuristic when making decisions or whether
task-specific heuristics may be created. Research by Gigerenzer and
colleagues (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Todd &
Gigerenzer, 2012) suggests that rather than having one set of
“generic” heuristics for all situations, they propose that individuals rely
on a set of “building blocks” that are unconscious intuitive rules that
allow the construction of heuristics to fit the environment. Essentially,
these heuristics involve a “search” for relevant cues in the environ-
ment, “stop” or inhibit a search for more information in the environ-
ment, and “make decisions,” a choice based on the information
obtained. This approach suggests that rather than generic heuristics
being the source of decision processes, more general principles built
within a constructive context is the basis for decision strategies peo-
ple employ. As Gigerenzer and colleagues point out, these “fast and
frugal” heuristics rely on information in the environment rather than
complicated calculations. Because complex decision modeling can
contain multiple parameters with different goals, a decision maker
may be overwhelmed and become confused whereas the simple, yet
effective decision strategies remain effective.
It should also be noted that the glucose manipulation in this study
was by no means extreme. Short fasting intervals and soft drinks are
common in many diets. It may be that larger variations in glucose
levels, such as those experienced by individuals with certain medical
conditions, will have a greater influence on decision making. Never-
theless, the findings from our study add to a growing body of research
that focuses on understanding how physiological and psychological
factors interact to form the decision-making process.
In Study 2, we found that glucose enrichment did have a signifi-
cant effect on attribute framing resistance, but not risky choice.
When we did a more focused analysis, we found that this effect was
largely due to differences in the positive attribute framing condition
revealing a less positive attribute framing average under glucose
enrichment. Although beyond the scope of these studies, it would be
interesting for future research to examine this challenging finding
and, if replicable, to further explore why glucose enrichment
decreases attribute positivity responses only in the positive framing
condition. Inquiries of this question should ask whether glucose
enrichment might be decreasing overall positivity or whether it may
be supporting a more thoughtful analysis that is sensitive to key
information leading to less frame-biased responses. This question
resembles recent work (Levin et al., 2014, 2015) that has suggested
that attribute framing is more affectively driven whereas risky choice
is more cognitive in nature. Future researchers may want to consider
this as part of their design.
As a final note, we should point out some limitations that con-
strict the applicability of our findings. First, we used NFC as a measure
of thinking. NFC is a measure of motivated thinking, and, because col-
lege students vary little in cognitive ability, using cognitive ability as a
control variable would likely not have affected the findings of Study
1. This should be noted in future research. Further, we used NFC
ranges that represented very high and very low scoring individuals
from a college population. Although most sampling methodologies
(e.g., online samples, convenience samples, and in-house sleep lab
studies) have their inherent limitations, our method did allow for sam-
pling of both high and low individuals. We caution future researchers
who might be investigating NFC to thoughtfully consider whether
relying on a median split drawn from a college sample will suffer from
a lack of power and representation. We encourage researchers in the
area to strive for more diverse and representative samples for
research involving individual differences. Lastly, it is possible that
some of the null findings for the less complex tasks may have
occurred because of low sample sizes and could manifest in larger
samples. This raises the possibility that NFC and glucose may play a
stronger role in complex tasks but may also be influencing less com-
plex decision tasks to a lesser extent. A final limitation that should be
noted is that our current analysis does not distinguish between think-
ing more and thinking more insightfully, a point that future research
may want to consider.
5 | CONCLUSION
These findings tell a tale of two players: One player is the person
who varies in how thoughtfully he or she considers a decision; the
other is the task, which varies with respect to complexity and sim-
plicity of its constructive elements. We tested two hypotheses sur-
rounding this view. First, we predicted that, for complex decision
tasks, more optimal decision choices would be found when the
decision maker is more thoughtful. Second, we predicted that, for
simpler decision tasks, decision-making performance would not be
affected by the thoughtfulness of the decision maker. The findings
across two methodologically different but conceptually similar stud-
ies support this view. In Study 1, we measured the individual dif-
ference variable of NFC, and in Study 2, we used a manipulated
variable of glucose level. Between these studies, we describe how
the thoughtfulness of the person and the constructive elements of
the task allow for a more complete understanding of how thinking
interacts with the decision task. In a sense, the task is dependent
upon the thoughtfulness of the person, and the person is con-
strained by the constructive elements of the task. When evaluating
normative reasoning decision tasks that are simple, the person is
limited by the elements of the task, and greater depth of thought
gives little advantage. When normative tasks are more complex
and contain elements that allow more thinking to yield advantages,
then more thoughtful persons can obtain better decision outcomes.
In this paper, we portray a decision-making event in which each
player—task and person—has a powerful influence on decision
choice, but an accurate depiction of the event cannot be found
without knowing the interactive nature of the two.
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